Conventional political wisdom holds that policies that make voting easier will increase turnout and ultimately benefit Democratic candidates. We challenge this assumption, questioning the ability of party strategists to predict which changes to election law will advantage them.
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To underline the importance of a turnout strategy heavily used by his campaign, in 2012 Barack Obama became the first president to vote early. It was widely believed that early voting, particularly among young people, new voters, and racial and ethnic minorities, made a significant contribution to his two victories.
1 Given this belief, it is unsurprising that Republicans tried to shorten the early voting period in swing states such as Florida, Ohio, and Wisconsin, restrictions that Democrats and affiliated groups vigorous opposed. 2 Yet virtually no one involved in these legal fights questioned the assumption that early voting increases turnout and the Democrats' vote share. Indeed, the recent legal tussles over early voting, same day registration, and voter identification mimic a debate that took 20 years earlier about the introduction of "motor voter" reforms. Since that time, the partisan divide over the effects of election laws has escalated to become "the voting wars" in which parties alter laws, go to court, and formulate campaign strategies in ways they believe will increase their vote share (Hasen 2012 ). Efforts to restrict early voting are grouped by scholars as part of a wider political strategy to restrict voter access for partisan gain (Bentele and O'Brien 2012) .
We challenge the conventional wisdom in several ways. To begin, we suggest that party leaders will sometimes be wrong about which side will benefit from a change in an election law.
Not all laws making it easier to register and vote actually increase turnout. And an increase in 1 A headline from the day before the 2012 election illustrates how embedded these beliefs became for the campaigns: George Zornick, "Obama Campaign Believes Early Vote Has Put them over the Top," The Nation, November 5, 2012.
3 turnout does not necessarily help Democrats. Debates and empirical studies have overlooked the means by which turnout is affected by a particular law, if at all. We find that election day registration helps Democrats as expected, but early voting, by itself, actually helps Republicans.
Early voting's surprising effect is due to its indirect effects in reducing overall mobilization even while it lowers the direct costs of voting. There are several plausible reasons why Democrats might continue to advocate for more early voting, but improving their fortunes at the polls should not be among them unless early voting is combined with same day or election day registration.
We conclude with several suggestions for future research and what our findings indicate for partisan manipulation of election practices.
All Efforts at Increasing Turnout Are Not Equal
It is easy to see why so many observers associate easier voting practices with more votes for the Democrats. The two have become correlated in recent elections, as shown in Table 1. The   table presents (both mail and in-person) still voted for Obama at a rate more than three percentage points higher than traditional election day voters.
Insert Table 1 here
It is tempting to infer from these patterns that early voting caused an increase in the Democratic vote share. The 2012 Obama campaign concluded as much in its post-election review, surmising that the "early vote offered eligible voters expanded access and convenience"
and "the campaign's effort to encourage supporters to take advantage of this opportunity was 4 tremendously successful," especially for "voters who the campaign had specifically prioritized for early vote: sporadic supporters" ( However, the fact that traditionally Democratic constituencies such as young people and African
Americans prefer to vote early does not necessarily mean that early voting, by itself, has a causal effect in boosting the Democratic vote share. That Democratic-leaning voters make disproportionate use of the practice is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the law to benefit Democratic candidates. The counterfactual question still looms: how many Democratic and Republican voters would have abstained without such options?
We build our argument on the foundations of two existing theories. First, we follow Burden et al.'s (2014) argument that election laws have both direct and indirect effects on voter turnout. Direct effects involve the immediate costs placed on potential voters, including the information, time, or effort required to vote. Indirect effects have to do with how the law changes the behavior of other actors, such as the media, parties, campaigns, and social organizations, who are involved in mobilizing voters and thus underwriting the costs of participation. The direct effects are widely understood, but indirect effects are usually overlooked. This is problematic because the net effect of election laws on turnout is the combination of these two pathways.
The second theoretical foundation for our study is Berinsky's (2005) insight about the "perverse" effects of many election laws. Although many election laws are designed to 5 "stimulate" new participants, in practice most conveniences are better at "retaining" likely voters than bringing out new voters. Making election laws more accommodating to offer things such as absentee voting often benefits regular voters who might otherwise have their voting habits disrupted but does not necessarily mobilize additional voters unless parties or other groups take advantage of the opportunities those changes present (Oliver 1996) .
To illustrate how these two theories work in practice, we contrast two popular election practices designed to facilitate voter participation: election day registration (EDR) and early voting. Both lower the direct costs of voting. By eliminating the pre-election registration "closing date," EDR transforms the two-step process of registering and voting into a single action at the polling place. By allowing more days on which ballots may be cast, early voting provides alternatives for people who find traditional election day less convenient. But EDR and early voting have quite different indirect effects.
We hypothesize that EDR is better at "stimulation" of more marginal voters while early voting is better at "retention" of those already likely to vote. Under EDR, the parties, campaigns, and social organizations have a great incentive to turn out all of their supporters on election day.
Because registration is not required before election day, a larger pool of eligible but unregistered voters remains ripe for mobilization, making election day an important social event that may nudge potential nonvoters into becoming voters. As a result, the indirect effect of EDR is also positive, leading to an even bigger net positive effect on turnout. It is not surprising that EDR might increase turnout and help Democrats.
In contrast, early voting appears to lower the direct costs of participation by providing more days on which to vote. Yet it does not remedy the need for pre-registration, and registration is a powerful predictor who will vote (Highton 2004; Timpone 1998 
The Partisan Effects of Higher Turnout
A large scholarly literature has examined the relationship between voter turnout and support for Democrats. The working hypothesis in that research is that nonvoters tend to come from demographic groups more sympathetic to Democrats: People who are younger, lower socioeconomic status, minority, urban, less religious, single, and geographically mobile. Because nonvoters tend to have demographic characteristics that are associated with voting Democratic,
"increases in turnout" should "enlarge the vote share of Democratic candidates" (Hansford and 7 Gomez 2010, 269) . As a result, Republicans benefit from lower turnout. This general premise fuels the conventional wisdom that making voting easier benefits Democrats.
It is thus not surprising that Democratic officials in EDR states overwhelmingly support the practice while GOP leaders in the same states are usually opposed to it (Franklin and Grier 1997) . Interviews show that "[p]arty officials' feelings about EDR tend to correspond with views about participation and the perceived effect EDR has on the success of their party" (Hanmer 2009, 171 ). Yet the assumption that EDR advantages the Democratic party has never been tested systematically. The only evidence comes from cursory examinations of correlations between turnout and vote share (Calvert and Gilchrist 1993; Brians and Grofman 2001; Radcliff 1994) 
Data and Methods
We analyze how combinations of election laws affected the partisanship of the vote in the 2004, 2008, and 2012 presidential elections. To provide continuity with earlier research, we draw on existing measures to estimate several types of regression models of county level outcomes.
Our data, measures, and logic of estimation build directly on the work of Burden et al. (2014) .
By analyzing three elections that produced different partisan outcomes, we are better able to We begin with simple cross-sectional models and then conduct several extensions to demonstrate their robustness. After showing the baseline results, we examine the effects of lengthening the early voting and same day registration periods, then account for the density of early voting locations, and finally estimate more stringent difference-in-difference models.
The Burden et al. (2014) framework on which we lean focuses on three kinds of election laws: election day registration, early voting, and same day registration. Election day registration (EDR) permits eligible voters to both register and vote on election day. This should increase turnout by eliminating the need for two separate actions: registering in advance and then casting a ballot at a later date and at a separate location. Early voting permits eligible voters to cast ballots without excuse prior to election day. Although early voting policies include varied elements, they all eliminate the need for the voter to appear at a polling place on election day.
Here, we code states with "no excuse" absentee voting or permanent absentee voting as early voting states. (In subsequent models we introduce some distinctions among early voting practices, namely the number of days it is offered, in-person versus absentee rules, and the density of early voting locations.) Finally, same day registration (SDR) permits eligible voters to both register and vote in a single act prior to election day. To allow for interactions among the laws, we create dummy variables to represent the five combinations of these provisions.
consistent effects, although the triad of EDR, SDR, and early voting showed large positive effects. Here we extend the logic about turnout to how laws affect the distribution of votes for the two parties.
To the degree that the three laws influence net turnout, it is relatively clear what effects should be observed for each combination of laws if we expect a positive effect of turnout on the Democrats' vote share in general. Because EDR on its own boosts turnout both directly and indirectly, it should also help the Democrats. But if early voting on its own has a net effect that is either null or negative, it should -contrary to widespread belief -not help and might even hurt the Democrats. The combination of the two practices, by combining stimulation and retention effects, should help the Democrats, as should the combination of EDR, SDR, and early voting.
We estimate regression models in which the dependent variable is the share of the vote won by the Democratic presidential candidate. The key independent variables are dummy variables indicating the five combinations of laws. The models include control variables for three other election laws (voter ID, felon disenfranchisement, and 30-day registration closing dates), a host of demographic variables such as income, education and, race, and dummy variables for states with idiosyncratic practices of all-mail balloting (OR and WA) and no voter registration (ND). We use clustered standard errors to account for cross-sectional dependence of observations within states or within counties over time.
We estimate four models. The baseline model is a simple linear regression predicting out an argument against reverse causation and then estimate a set of models using a differencein-difference specification. This approach leverages change over time to see how a change in laws within a state affects election outcomes EDR helped the Democrats in both elections by a similar amount. The findings suggest that in both cases, the impact of the laws on turnout translates into partisan effects in an intuitive fashion. We are confident in the direction and significance of the early voting effect because it is based on a sizable number of states with such laws and because they hold up across three different contexts of the Bush and Obama elections (a narrow Republican win, a safe Democratic win, and a more competitive Democratic win, as measured by the national popular vote).
Results
Insert Table 2 here
The three-way combination of early voting, EDR, and SDR also has positive effects for the Democrats in all three elections. The two-way combination of SDR and early voting has no effect. Somewhat surprisingly, the combination of EDR and early voting has a negative effect on the Democratic vote share, but this result is probably driven by the small number of states and counties with that particular combination. we re-estimated the models after including a dummy variable for the six New England states. As expected, that variable was highly significant and positive, but early voting maintained its significant and negative effect.
13 of the estimates. The simple cross-sectional models produce effects that might be implausibly large (a concern we address below) and rely on crude measures of early voting and SDR (dichotomous indicators that do not reflect variations in how the laws actually work across the states). Although we cannot account for all of the diversity of specific practices in this analysis, it is prudent to at least control for some important variants to check the robustness of the results.
In our second set of models, we consider how long each early voting option is available.
Much of the recent legal wrangling in the states has been about how many days early voting is offered. To account for this variety, for the 2008 election we code states the length of the early voting and SDR "windows" in days. 7 The idea is similar to the "dose-response" model of medicine. If causation is at work, then a small amount of the treatment should result in a small response while a larger dose will produce a larger effect. If a little early voting is thought to help Democrats, then a longer period should benefit the party even more. We also show variations of the models after limiting the sample to counties that have early voting (thus removing our five key election law measures). The results do little to alter our conclusions. The number of early voting sites per capita does not have a statistically significant effect in any of the models. The density of election day sites is significant in only one of the four models. Meanwhile, the presence early voting on its own continues to have a negative and significant effect on the Democratic vote share in one of the two elections even when controlling for density of locations. EDR has a positive effect in both elections. Although other details in how early voting is implemented might affect the relative turnout of Democratic and Republican voters, our findings indicate that the Democrats are not helped by the mere availability of early voting on its own, when it is offered for a longer period of time, or even when there are more locations.
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The results of the alternative coding system appear in 
Addressing the Problem of Endogeneity
Despite the introduction of several models of early voting, a lingering concern with our cross-sectional approach is the possibility of endogeneity in the election law variables. For example, the political culture of a state may encourage political participation, and also lead to election of politicians who favor making voting easier. Even more worrisome, causation might run the opposite of the direction we assume. It is possible that partisan control of a state may lead parties to select laws that will increase the vote share of that party. This could make it appear that laws affect the fortunes of the parties, when in fact what we are observing is that the fortunes of the parties affect the law.
While this concern must be taken seriously, we note two reasons that the possibility of endogeneity should not be used to discard evidence of the effects of election laws. First, we have suggested that partisan elites are often poor predictors of the effects of election laws. Third, in the case of EDR, there is little evidence that policies were adopted by Democrats to maintain their control of government. Hanmer (2009) argues that EDR adoption occurred in two waves. The first wave took place in the 1970s and was aimed at increasing turnout. Given the quite different -and less polarized -party politics of the time, there is real doubt about whether the covert goal was to help Democrats. It would be a mistake to assume that contemporary relationships between election laws and outcomes today applied in the same way 40 years ago. In fact, a study by Neiheisel and Burden (2012) finds that first wave EDR adoption in Wisconsin actually helped the Republicans. The second wave states of the 1990s were less interested in increasing voter turnout than in minimizing costs and avoiding compliance with the 1993 National Voter Registration Act (i.e., the "Motor Voter" law). If anything, this motivation 11 Biggers and Hanmer (2015) find that the partisanship of state office holders had no effect on adoption of no-excuse absentee voting and a small effect on adoption of in-person early voting.
ought to work against our hypothesis. In fact, in 2012 the correlation between the two-party Democratic vote and whether a state had EDR is essentially zero (r = -.04, p = .78).
Nevertheless, to systematically address the endogeneity question we estimate differencein-difference models as an especially challenging test of causation. These models estimate the change in the Democratic vote share as a function of change in election laws. While noting that other factors such as political culture or demographics may have an effect on the vote, inclusion of the proper control variables is less important in the difference-in-difference approach than in the cross-sectional models. The differenced models take advantage of the fact that these variables evolve too slowly to be responsible for changes in turnout in elections separated by only four years. These background variables would only affect the intercept in a difference-in-difference model, a parameter that has no inherent interest in this study. Election laws, in contrast, change more abruptly and could affect the slope of our election variable coefficients. 12 For these reasons the method has been an effective tool for studying the effects of election laws (see Burden et al. 2014; Hanmer 2009; Leighley and Nagler 2014) .
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Our models also include differences in laws concerning voter ID and enfranchisement of ex-felons. Although not necessary if effects are uniform across the states, other demographics are entered in their raw "level" form in a second specification. This allows for a change in the 12 These models thus estimate the immediate effects of changes in election laws. Longer-term effects might be different.
13 Keele and Minozzi (2013) A limitation of the difference-in-difference approach in our application is that few states actually changed their election laws between elections. As Table A1 in the Appendix shows, for some combinations of laws there are no changes at all. For others the number of states changing is as low as one or two. As result, we cannot include some of the variables in the model because they do not change. For some other variables the interpretation of the coefficients would be ambiguous given the small number of states involved; the dummy variables essentially become fixed effects for one or two states. To minimize these ambiguities we adopt a conservative approach and focus only on the law that changed the most: early voting.
14 The difference-in-different results appear in Table 6 . As before, the results show that early voting on its own decreases the Democratic vote share, although significantly so only for the 2008 to 2012 time period. In counties where a state adopted early voting between elections 2008 and 2012, the Democrats lost more than a percentage point in the vote. The effects in the difference-and-difference specification are smaller and probably more realistic given that the method eliminates spurious or endogenous relationships by design. This difficult test thus confirms our earlier result that early voting on its own at least sometimes helps Republicans and shows no evidence of helping Democrats.
14 We alter the variable coding somewhat to capture any change in early voting (whether or not EDR and SDR change). This mimics the matching analysis in Table 3 of Burden et al. (2014) . 
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Insert Table 6 here Because some election laws do not change sufficiently between consecutive elections, we also made efforts to increase variation in the independent variables. In the Appendix we present difference-in-difference models where the data are "stacked" such that the 2004-2008 and 2008-2012 differences are all combined in a single dataset. Early voting never has a positive effect on the Democratic vote. The estimated effect is negative across all four specifications in Table A2 and is statistically significant in one of them models.
Conclusion
We have shown that policy changes designed to increase turnout -even those widely assumed to benefit Democrats -produce complicated and sometimes unexpected effects.
Combining the results in this paper with those in earlier studies, we confirm that EDR is the provision that most clearly increases turnout and generally aids the Democrats. In contrast, and most striking, early voting does not, and in many cases actually aids the Republicans. Only when early voting is combined with at least one version of "one-stop shopping" for both registration and voting are both turnout and election outcomes affected in the way that conventional wisdom expects. It seems that parties do not always know what is good for them.
How might party leaders sometimes get it wrong? One reason is that party organizations are often closed echo chambers. As part of a club where loyalty is important, outside and conflicting information is sometimes discounted. Another reason is that party officials are conceptualizing election laws too broadly. When people insist that early voting aids the Democrats, we suspect that they are unwittingly looking at combinations of laws rather than early voting in isolation. Rising black voter turnout in North Carolina helped the Democrats win 21 the state in 2008 for the first time in 32 years. But the Tar Heel State did not only offer early voting; it also offered up to 17 days of same day voter registration. It may also be that parties rely too much on compelling examples at the expense of a more systematic analysis. The North Carolina case offers a memorable and seemingly intuitive story about early voting that forms and reinforces a conventional wisdom to the point that more in-depth analysis is not undertaken.
Moreover, our study is largely about the effects of adding provisions not the effects of removing them. For most of the American history, states have expanded options for voting by lengthening the window for registration and adding various forms of absentee and early voting.
Those changes on their own might have limited benefits for Democrats, at least in the short-run.
In contrast, when a state removes a provision that is disproportionately used by Democratic voters, the disruption will be more severe and immediate. Future research should explore the potential asymmetry between the expansion and contraction of election practices.
Even if early voting does not help Democrats in terms of immediate election results, there are still several reasons why they -and Republicans and even nonpartisan reformers, for that matter -might continue to support it. Banking the votes of supporters early on frees them up to become election day volunteers who can do canvassing, phone calls, or poll watching. Early voting might allow for more economical campaigning by allowing the party to redeploy resources toward people whose votes have yet to be cast as election day approaches. Building a lead in early voting can also create a sense of momentum and inevitability that may demoralize opponents. Finally, some election officials might advocate for early voting as a way to reduce the number of voters who must be served on election day. Although it is difficult to quantify all of these various benefits, together they might outweigh the loss in votes due to early voting itself.
As a broader matter of political strategy, Democrats have framed opposition to election laws that make voting harder -such as voter ID laws and eliminating EDR -as matters of political principle centered on protecting voter access. Having taken such a stance, it becomes difficult to selectively oppose early voting, which is widely used by Democratic voters. For the same reasons, Republican political claims on the need to protect the integrity of the voting process cannot be neatly applied to some election laws and not others. Having established broad political principles to justify their approach on election policies, parties are straitjacketed from moving away from them in an opportunistic way, even if the political principles were originally developed strategically and opportunistically.
The surprising effects of early voting show that partisan leaders can be incorrect in the assumptions they make about the partisan consequences of election practices. Without systematic facts to correct misinformation, policymakers may well push for reforms that work against their partisan interests. One can only hope that the reforms emerging from partisan strategizing inadvertently make elections better.
More research on the partisan effects of election laws is needed. Although our results held up across three different elections, it is possible that the effects of turnout are different in lower salience midterm elections or in local elections where turnout is usually much lower.
Election laws might also have different effects in an earlier era when self-identified Democrats were a larger share of the electorate. The partisan implications of election laws are not static and might well evolve over time (Martinez and Gill 2005) . In recent elections a generation gap has emerged in which young voters are strongly Democratic and older voters are solidly Republican.
With this configuration, a law such that increases the turnout of young people would probably help the Democrats. But this generational cleavage is relatively new, emerging during the George W. Bush years, and it might dissipate or reverse in the future, creating a reversal of fortunes under the same law. Myopic partisan politicians are unlikely to anticipate these far off consequences, or at least they are unlikely to care about them if they remain focused on the most immediate election.
A promising avenue for additional research is to explore how the effects of election laws are conditioned by socioeconomic status. Recent studies point to some surprising results. Leighley and Nagler (2014) find uneven effects of EDR across demographic groups. Rigby and Springer (2011) conclude that EDR generally reduces inequalities in turnout between people with high and low incomes, whereas in-person early voting actually exacerbates it. Wichowsky's (2012) study also finds a negative, albeit insignificant, relationship between absentee and early voting and income inequality in turnout.
This paper helps correct the conventional wisdom of how election laws shape election outcomes. Relationships are not set in stone, but are likely to evolve as parties reorganize their party mobilization efforts to neutralize the perceived advantages of other parties. Republicanleaning states such as Colorado and Texas were some of the first to adopt early voting provisions, perhaps because the convenience would allow them to mobilize their supporters more effectively. Views have changed, but both parties continue to see election laws as vehicle for securing strategic advantages. For example, legislative redistricting is often openly partisan to the point where the dominant party makes little effort to disguise its intent. In some cases, parties may use the language of good government to cloak their goals. When Democrats pushed for "motor voter" in the early 1990s, it was driven by a desire to improve democracy but also to benefit their party. When Republicans seek to restrict early voting, they may do so in the name of relieving the burden on local election officials in the run up to the election and potentially 24 reducing the amount of money spent by campaigns. Democrats argue for expanding voter access and turnout, as well as alleviating the crush of voters to be processed on election day. Both sides can make compelling arguments, but it is difficult to separate the partisan advantage being sought from a genuine effort to improve the conduct of elections.
As the partisan effects of voting laws become clearer, it also becomes more evident that partisan officials who make election laws operate under a clear conflict of interest. It is difficult for elected officials to have reasoned debates on the reform of election laws when they have also strong incentives to support policies that will benefit them. Partisan tinkering with election laws thus has the potential to weaken the legitimacy of election systems. One policy implication of our work is that the design of election laws should protect against this conflict rather than be used as an instrument of partisan warfare. In the area of redistricting for example, the state of Iowa has non-partisan actors draw the district lines, and the legislature makes an up-and-down vote on the outcome. A similar model might be applied to other election laws, helping to increase public confidence in the outcome and reduce partisan strategizing to manipulate how the right to vote is exercised. 
